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Heiberg: A Survey of Important Decisions of the Minnesota Supreme Court: 1

III. CONTRACTS AND THE
UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE
A. Cross-claimfor Indemnity and Contributionnot Subject to the
Uniform Commercial Code Statute of Limitations
In City of Willmar v. Short-Elliot-Hendrickson, Inc.,1 the
Minnesota Supreme Court held that a cross-claim for indemnity
and contribution is not subject to the four-year statute of
limitations established by the Uniform Commercial Code
(U.C.C.).' In so doing, Minnesota adopted the majority view
and overruled a Minnesota Court of Appeals ruling that barred
a third-party action for contribution if the original injured
plaintiff would be barred from bringing such a suit.'
The litigation in this case began in 1987 when the City of
Willmar sued for damages in connection with the continued
malfunctioning of a water treatment plant.4 The parties named
as defendants included the general contractor, the consulting
engineers, and the manufacturer of a major component of the
plant.' The consulting engineers, Short-Elliot-Hendrickson, Inc.
("Short-Elliot"), settled with the City of Willmar and obtained a
general release.6 Short-Elliot then continued the present action
against the manufacturer of certain rotating cylinders used in the
plant, Clow Corporation (Clow), for contribution and indemnity
of a portion of the settlement paid to the City of Willmar.'
Clow objected to the indemnity and contribution claims on three
grounds.
First, Clow argued that the contribution and indemnity
claims were barred by the four year statute of limitations
contained in the U.C.C. s They reasoned that the claims for

1. 512 N.W.2d 872 (Minn. 1994).
2. Id.at 877.
3. Id.
4. Id.at 873.
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. Minnesota Statutes section 336.2-725 provides in part: " 1) An action for breach
of any contract for sale must be commenced within four years after the cause of action
has accrued. 2) A cause of action accrues when the breach occurs, regardless of the
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contribution and indemnity were simply extensions of the breach
of warranty claims based on the sale of the rotating cylinders,
The
and therefore, the action was governed by the U.C.C.9
trial court disagreed with Clow, but the Minnesota Court of
Appeals reversed, holding that the four-year statute of limitations
contained in the U.C.C. did limit the ability 10of Short-Elliot to
bring the contribution and indemnity claims.
The Minnesota Supreme Court held that the statute of
limitations contained in the U.C.C. did not apply in this case.
Indemnity and contribution are independent and separate
common law claims in Minnesota designed to promote equity."
Contribution requires: 1) a common liability of two or more
actors to the injured party; and 2) payment by one of the actors
of more than its fair share of the common liability. 12 Indemnity
applies in most situations when 1) a party fails to discover or
prevent another's fault; and 2) as a consequence pays damages
for which the other is primarily liable.'"
Because these are equitable remedies not founded in either
contract or tort exclusively, the nature of the common liability
between the actors is of secondary importance. The true
determination is whether one actor has paid more than its fair
share of a common liability.'4 Therefore, the fact that the
arose out of a contract for
claims for contribution and indemnity
5
irrelevant.
is
goods
the sale of
Clow argued that it was unfair to hold an actor liable under
contribution or indemnity law, when the original plaintiff would
have been barred from bringing a claim against the actor.' 6

aggrieved party's lack of knowledge of the breach . . .. " MINN. STAT. § 336.2-725
(1994).
9. Willmar, 512 N.W.2d at 874.
10. City of Willmar v. Short-Elliot-Hedrickson, 498 N.W.2d 766, 768 (Minn. CL
App. 1993).
11. Minnesota Statute section 541.051, subdivision 1 recognizes an action for
contribution or indemnity by stating that the statute of limitations for these actions do
not accrue until the payment of the final judgment, arbitration award, or settlement.
See MINN. STAT. § 541.051, subd. 1 (1994).
12. See, e.g., White v.Johnson, 272 Minn. 363, 367-68, 137 N.W.2d 674, 677 (Minn.
1965), overrud on othergrounds, Tolbert v. Gerber Indus. 255 N.W.2d 362, 368 (Minn.
1977).
13. Tol&r 255 N.W.2d at 368.
14. City of Wilimar v. Short-Elliot-Hendrickson,512 N.W.2d 872, 874 (Minn. 1994).
15. Id.
16. Id. at 875.

http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol22/iss1/17

2

1996]

Heiberg: A Survey of ImportantCONTRACTS
Decisions of the Minnesota Supreme Court: 1

This result, they argued, frustrated the purpose of the limitation
of actions law.17 The court rejected this argument and adopted
the position taken by thirteen other states.'
The court held
that under Minnesota Statutes section 541.051, Short-Elliot was
barred from bringing the action more than two years after the
settlement agreement, and therefore there was not a frustration
of the purpose of the limitation of actions law.19
Second, Clow argued that allowing Short-Elliot to continue
its claims for contribution and indemnity would violate the
exclusivity of the U.C.C. in governing commercial transactions.2" As support, Clow pointed to the long line of Minnesota
cases that have attempted to establish when a party may recover
for an economic loss in tort for damages to "other property" or
"personal injury" arising out of a transaction involving the sale
of goods.21 The court, however, easily dismissed these arguments by holding that the claims for contribution and indemnity
were not based upon a contract for the sale of goods, but were
instead based upon the equitable doctrine that a party can
recover amounts for which it has paid more than its share of a
common liability.22 Since these claims were not within the
province of the U.C.C., the exclusivity doctrine of the U.C.C. did
not apply.2
Finally, Clow argued that the U.C.C. provides the exclusive
remedies available to Short-Elliot because under Minnesota's
broad definition of privity, Short-Elliot was in privity with the
City, and therefore was within the chain of title for the compo-

17. Id.
18. Id. at 875 n.5. The jurisdictions which have adopted this rule are California,
Kansas, Maine, Maryland, Michigan, Missouri, Nebraska, New Hampshire, New York,
North Carolina, Pennsylvania, Virginia, and West Virginia. Five jurisdictions have
adopted Glow's argument: Georgia, Idaho, South Dakota, Utah and Washington.
19. Id. at 873. Because of the difference in when the statutes of limitations begin
running, the two year statute of limitations under Minnesota Statutes § 541.051 is

actually longer than the four-year period allowed under the U.C.C.
20. See Hapka v. Paquin Farms, 458 N.W.2d 683, 684 (Minn. 1990) (holding that
the U.C.C. was intended to create a complete statutory governance of all commercial
transactions).
21. See MINN. STAT. § 604.10 (1994); Lloyd F. Smith Co. v. Den-Tal-Ez, Inc., 491
N.W.2d 11 (Minn. 1992); Hapka v. Paquin Farms, 458 N.W.2d 683 (Minn. 1990);
Thofson v. Redex Indus., 433 N.W.2d 901 (Minn. Ct. App. 1989).
22. Willmar, 512 N.W.2d at 876.
23. Id.; see also MINN. STAT. § 336.2-318 (1994) (Minnesota's privity statute under
the U.C.C.).
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nents sold by Clow. 24 The court dismissed the privity argument

as irrelevant because contribution and indemnity are common
law remedies not precluded by the U.C.C. as evidenced by
Minnesota Statutes section 336.1-103 (1992), which states "Unless
displaced by the particular provisions of this chapter, the
principles of law and equity... shall supplement its provisions."
In conclusion, the Minnesota Supreme Court established
that the claims of contribution and indemnity are not governed
by the four year statute of limitations under the U.C.C. even
when such claims are the result of an action based upon
breaches of warranties established under the U.C.C.
B. Rent-to-Own Transactions are Consumer Credit Sales
In Miller v. Colortyme, Inc.,25 the court found that rent-to-own
transactions are to be considered consumer credit sales subject
to the Consumer Credit Sales Act (CCSA),26 and that they are
also subject to the interest rate limitations established in
Minnesota's general usury statute. 7
Delilah Miller was the representative of a class of people
who entered into "rent-to-own" agreements. 28 Under the
standard form used in these agreements, the renters would lease
furniture, appliances, televisions, and various other consumer
goods on a weekly or monthly basis. 29 At the end of each one
week or one month term, the renter had the unilateral option
to renew the lease by making another payment."0 After a
customer had renewed the contract for a predetermined number
of terms, she would obtain title and ownership of the goods for
no additional consideration.31
The total prices paid under these rent-to-own agreements
often exceeded the retail prices of the items. For example, one
such contract charged an individual renewing monthly for a total
of $1,350.40 for a washer and dryer with a stated cash price of

24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.

Wtrlmar, 512 N.W.2d at 876.
518 N.W.2d 544 (Minn. 1994).
MINN. STAT. §§ 325G.01-.51 (1994).
MINN. STAT. § 334.01 (1994).
Miler,518 N.W.2d at 546.
Id.
Id.

31.

Id.
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$800.75.2
The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the
customers, holding that the rent-to-own agreements were clearly
consumer credit sales. The Minnesota Court of Appeals
reversed. 3
The Minnesota Supreme Court first considered whether the
rent-to-own agreements were consumer credit sales within the
meaning of the CCSA. Under the common law, transactions that
were unilaterally terminable by the buyer were considered leases
and not sales.34 The Legislature eliminated this common law
interpretation of terminable transactions in 1981 when it
amended the CCSA."5 Under the amended statute, a terminable lease is considered sale of goods if: 1) the lessee has the
option to renew the contract by making payments as specified in
the agreement; 2) the contract obligates the lessor to transfer
ownership to the consumer if the consumer makes a predetermined number of renewals; and 3) the payments made by the
consumer
are roughly equivalent or in excess of the value of the
36

product.

Here, the terminable leases in question clearly satisfied all
three statutory requirements classifying them as a sale of goods.
Therefore, the court then turned its analysis to whether the sales
were actually protected by the CCSA as "consumer credit sales."
Minnesota Statutes section 325G.15 states that a "consumer
credit sale" is a sale of goods or services where: 1) credit is
granted by a seller who regularly engages as a seller in credit
transactions of the same kind; 2) the buyer is a natural person;
and 3) the goods are purchased primarily for a personal, family
or household purpose, and not for a commercial or business
purpose.3 7 The rental company argued that the rent-to-own
agreements did not constitute consumer "credit sale agreements"
under this definition because the seller did not extend credit.3"
Instead, they argued, the customers pre pay for the products,
and a missed payment results in non renewal with no future

32. Id.
33. Miller v. Colortyme, Inc., 504 N.W.2d 258 (Minn. Ct. App. 1993).
34. See Hughes v. Becker, 260 Minn. 83, 85, 108 N.W.2d 781, 783 (1961).
35. MINN. STAT. § 325G.15, subd. 5 (1994).
36.
37.
38.

Id.
MINN.STAT. § 325G.15, subd. 2 (1994).
Miller v. Colortyme, Inc., 518 N.W.2d 544, 548 (Minn. 1994).
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obligation. 9
The court disagreed. It found that the Legislature, in
amending the CCSA to include terminable leases as sales, had
specifically intended the CCSA to apply to rent-to-own contracts.'
If the language of the CCSA was read in accordance
with the interpretation forwarded by the rental companies, the
1981 amendment by the Legislature redefining certain terminable leases as sales would be meaningless.41
In addition, the court rejected the argument that there was
no credit extended because the buyer never actually incurred the
debt.42 A statute is entitled to a liberal construction to promote, not frustrate, its objectives.43 Here, the court held that
although the agreements were terminable at the end of each
rental term, they lost their terminable nature in reality because
as the amount of the total payments rose, the only feasible or
rational choice for the consumer became to complete the rental
payments under the contract."
Second, the court ruled that the rent-to-own agreements
were governed by the Minnesota general usury statutes.4 5 A
contract is usurious if the following elements are satisfied: 1)
there is a loan of money or a forbearance of a debt; 2) there is
an agreement between the parties that the principal shall be
payable absolutely; 3) the payment terms include an amount of
interest greater than allowed by law; and 4) there is the intention to evade the law at the inception of the agreement. 46
The rental companies argued that the rent-to-own contracts
were not usurious because there is no loan in which the
consumer incurs a debt, and there is no forbearance of a
debt.47 The court agreed that technically these contracts do
not constitute a loan, or a forbearance of the debt, but that the
Legislature's decision to treat rent-to-own transactions as credit
sales signifies the intent of the Legislature to consider them as

39.
40.

Id.
Id.

41.

Id.

42. Id.
43. Governmental Research Bureau v. Borgen, 224 Minn. 313, 317, 28 N.W.2d 760,
763 (1947).
44. Miller, 518 N.W.2d at 548 n.2.
45. See MINN. STAT. §§ 334.01 - .20 (1994).
46. Citizen's Nat'l Bank of Willmar v. Taylor, 368 N.W.2d 913, 918 (Minn. 1985).
47. Miller, 518 N.W.2d at 549.
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installment sales contracts under the law. 4 As a result, the
Minnesota general usury statutes do govern rent-to-own agreements.
Finally, the rental companies argued that the CCSA should
not apply to these transactions because the Rental Purchase
Agreement Act (RPAA) 4" repealed the CCSA with respect to
rent-to-own agreements. 5' The RPAA, enacted in 1990, regulates the rent-to-own industry by among other things limiting
delivery charges, 1 giving statements of rights to customers,52
imposing restrictions in the case of default,53 prohibiting
abusive debt practices, 54 and limiting security deposit
amounts. 5 The statute does not, however, purport to establish
In fact,
an exclusive system regulating rent-to-own contracts.5
the language of the statute provides that where the RPAA and
the CCSA conflict, the CCSA's provisions should govern.
In conclusion, the court held 1) that rent-to-own agreements
were sales of goods governed by the CCSA; 2) that these
agreements were also sales within the purview of the Minnesota
general usury statutes; and 3) that the CCSA was not repealed by
the RPAA.
C. Sale of Machinery Accompanied by a Lease is Subject to the
Uniform Commercial Code
In Vesta State Bank v. Independent State Bank of Minnesota58
the Minnesota Supreme Court found that: 1) a sale of a piece of
machinery and an accompanying lease is a sale of goods under
the Uniform Commercial Code (U.C.C.); and 2) a settlement for
payment on a personal guarantee does not bar a subsequent suit
for collection on a claim of fraud relating to that guarantee.

48. Id.
49. MINN. STAT. §§ 325F.84 - .98 (1994).
50. Mier,518 N.W.2d at 550.
51. MINN. STAT. § 325F.91 (1994).
52. MINN. STAT. § 325F.90 (1994).
53. MINN. STAT. § 325F.89 (1994).
54. MINN. STAT. § 325F.92 (1994).
55. MINN. STAT. § 325F.90 (1994).
56. Mi/er, 518 N.W.2d at 550.
57. See MINN. STAT. § 325F.97, subd. 2 (1994) (stating that the RPAA's provisions
are to be considered cumulative and shall not restrict any other remedy available at

law).
58.

518 N.W.2d 850 (Minn. 1994).
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Vesta State Bank of Minnesota (Vesta) entered into an
agreement for the purchase of an agricultural combine and the
accompanying lease.59 The combine and lease were purchased
from Lease Resources Corporation (Lease Resources) through
Independent State Bank of Minnesota (Independent) acting as
a broker.6 ° The combine was leased to a small family farmer
who also signed a personal guarantee. 1 The lease contained
an option to purchase the combine at the end of the term.62
Two years later, the farmer defaulted on his lease."3 Vesta
settled with the farmer on his guarantee, but they continued an
action against Independent for misrepresentation of the terms
of the individual guarantee, and of the assets of the lessee. 4
The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of
Independent, stating that Vesta's claims were barred both by the
four-year statue of limitations of the U.C.C. and by the election
of remedies doctrine.65
The Minnesota Court of Appeals
66
reversed.
First, the supreme court had to determine whether the
transaction in which Vesta acquired the combine and the lease
67
was a sale of goods such that it was governed by the U.C.C.
When a transaction involves the sale of both goods and services,
Minnesota uses a "predominant purpose" test to determine
whether the U.C.C. applies.' Under this predominant purpose
test, a hybrid transaction is classified according to its dominant
characteristic."
Vesta argued that the entire purpose of acquiring the
combine and the lease was to obtain investment services and
income, and that it had no interest in possessing, using, or

59. Id. at 852.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 853.
65. Id.
66. Vesta State Bank v. Independent State Bank, 506 N.W.2d 307 (Minn. CL App.
1993).
67. See MINN. STAT. § 336.2-102 (1994) (stating that the U.C.C. applies to
"transactions in goods").
68. McCarthy Well Co. v. St. Peter Creamery, Inc., 410 N.W.2d 312, 315 (Minn.
1987).
69. Id.
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owning the combine at the end of the lease period.7" Therefore, Vesta was merely purchasing the right to perform a
financial service for the farmer.71 The court disagreed. Vesta
became owner of the combine according to the bill of sale
exchanged in the transaction.72 In addition, Vesta obtained tax
advantages through its ownership of the combine including the
taking of accelerated depreciation." As a result, ownership was
the predominate purpose of the transaction regardless of the
characterization of the transaction as a stream of income, and
the four-year statute of limitations under the U.C.C. applied to
this transaction. 4
Second, because the fraud claims were not governed by the
four-year statute of limitations, the court still had to determine
whether the fraud claims were barred by the election of remedies doctrine. The election of remedies doctrine requires a
party to adopt one of two or more coexisting and inconsistent
remedies which arise out of the same set of facts.75 The
purpose of the doctrine is to prevent a double recovery for a
single wrong.7" A party should not, however, be bound by an
election unless she has pursued the chosen course of action to
a conclusion, or has procured an advantage from the election.7 7
If it is doubtful which of alternate theories may bring a remedy,
both may be brought until the injury is fully redressed.7 s
Independent argued that by accepting a settlement with the
family farmer on the guarantee, Vesta acknowledged the
guarantee's enforceability and therefore could not choose an
Independent for fraudulently
alternative remedy against
79
representing the guarantee.
The court disagreed. There was no bar due to the election

70.

Vesta, 518 N.W.2d at 854.

71.

Id.

72.

Id.

73. Id.
74. Id. at 855.
75. Magnusson v. American Allied Ins. Co., 290 Minn. 465, 472, 189 N.W.2d 28,
33 (1971).
76. Id.
77. First Nat'l Bank of Osakis v. Flynn, 190 Minn. 102, 107, 250 N.W. 806, 808
(1933).
78. Northwestern State Bank, Osseo v. Foss, 293 Minn. 171, 177, 197 N.W.2d 662,
666 (1972).
79. Vesta State Bank v. Independent State Bank of Minn., 518 N.W.2d 850, 855
(Minn. 1994).
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of remedies doctrine because there was no risk of a double
redress for the injury.8 0 The action on the guarantee was
entirely separate and independent of the action for fraud.8" As
separate actions, they arose from separate facts and created
separate injuries. As 2a result, Vesta had the right to be made
8
whole under the law.
In conclusion, the supreme court reestablished the predominant purpose test by holding that a transfer of a combine and a
lease of the combine was a sale of goods under the U.C.C. The
court also held that on default of the lease the buyer could
maintain actions against both the lessee and the seller of the
lease as long as the injuries were separate and independent of
one another.
D. Indemnity Agreements Must be Specific
In National Hydro Systems v. M. A. Mortenson Co.' the
Minnesota Supreme Court found that for an indemnity agreement to allow a party to sign away liability for its own negligence,
the agreement must specifically state that such negligence is
indemnified.
A general contractor, M.A. Mortenson Company (Mortenson), entered into an agreement with an engineering firm, HDR
Engineering (HDR), for the design of a portion of a water
treatment plant.8 4 The agreement contained an indemnity
agreement in which Mortenson promised to hold HDR harmless
from losses or expenses "[W]hether founded in breach of
contract, negligence, or pursuant to contract provisions .... ."85
Mortenson also contracted with National Hydro Systems
("National") to purchase one of the main components of the
86
treatment plant.
Due to numerous design problems, the project was delayed,
and as a result National was late in providing the components it
promised. 7 Mortenson withheld a part of the payment due to

80.
81.
82.

Id.
Id. at 856.
Id.

83.

529 N.W.2d 690 (Minn. 1995).

84. Id. at 692.
85.
86.
87.

Id.
Id.
Id.
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the delay, and National sued for the balance due.8 8 The parties
entered into a Pierringerrelease in which National settled its
claim against Mortenson and pursued HDR for negligent
design.89
The trial court granted summary judgment, holding that the
indemnity agreement between Mortenson and HDR coupled
with the Pierringerrelease created a "circuity of obligation" thus
rendering the claim invalid as a matter of law.9" The Minnesota Court of Appeals reversed.9 1
A circuity of obligation is created when, by virtue of a preexisting indemnity agreement, the plaintiff in an action is
obligated to indemnify the defendant for the the plaintiff's own
claim.9 2 In other words, circuity arises when a plaintiff literally
sues herself by suing someone she has agreed to indemnify.9 3
National first argued there was not a circuity of obligation
because public policy prohibits engineers from obtaining
indemnity agreements protecting the engineers for claims arising
out of their own negligence.94 The court dismissed this argument holding that Minnesota favors risk allocation agreements
95
in the construction setting.
The key question before the court then became whether the
indemnity agreement in the original contract was sufficient to
indemnify HDR for its negligent design of the water treatment
plan. 96 The court adopted the strict construction interpretation
of indemnity agreements.97
Under the strict construction
theory, an indemnity agreement only provides indemnity for
harms which are specifically enumerated in the indemnification

88. Id.
89. A Pierringer release is a settlement document in which in return for an
admission of liability, the plaintiff agrees to defend, indemnify and hold harmless the
defendant in the claim against the third-party defendant. The plaintiff under such a
settlement steps into the shoes of the defendant with respect to his claims against the
third-party defendant. See Pierringer v. Hoger, 124 N.W.2d 106 (Wis. 1963).
90. National Hydro Sys., 529 N.W.2d at 692.
91. National Hydro Sys. v. MA. Mortenson Co., 507 N.W.2d 27 (Minn. Ct. App.
1993).
92. Hoffinan v. Wiltzcheck, 411 N.W.2d 923, 926 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987), petitionfor
review denied, (Minn. 1987).
93. Id.
94. National Hydro Sys., 529 N.W.2d at 693.
95. Id.

96. Id. at 694.
97.

Id.
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clause.9" This means that for a clause to allow indemnity to
HDR for its negligence, the clause must specifically enumerate
the intent of the parties to enter into such an indemnity
agreement in a clear and unequivocal manner.9"
Here, the court found that the clause provided indemnity
for HDR from claims arising out of negligence, but the clause
did not specifically enumerate indemnification existed for HDR's
own negligence. 100 As a result, there was no circuity of obligation, and National could continue, its action through trial on
remand. °1
E.

ConsequentialDamages Under the Uniform Commercial Code

In InternationalFinancialServices, Inc. v. Franz,10 2 the Minnesota Supreme Court established that limitations on remedies that
fail their essential purpose do not necessarily cause limitations
on consequential damages to fail with them.
Allen Franz (Franz) entered into negotiations with the
Gerber Scientific Instrument Company (Gerber) for the
purchase of a photoplotter system.10 3 The photoplotter system
would be used to produce negatives that were needed to design
and build circuit boards. 0 4 The deal was completed after a
long negotiation period, and delivery was arranged as soon as
Franz could build a "clean room" necessary to allow the photo105
plotter to work.
The agreement contained fairly standard warranty waiver
language and the following clause limiting the remedies
available:
GSI's liability and buyer's remedy under this warranty will be
limited to the repair and/or replacement at GSI's election of

98. Farmington Plumbing & Heating Co., v. Fischer Sand & Aggregate, Inc., 281
N.W.2d 838, 842 (1979) (citing Webster v. Klug & Smith, 260 N.W.2d 686, 690 (Wis.
1978)).
99. Braegelmann v. Horizon Dev. Co., 371 N.W.2d 644, 649 (Minn. Ct. App. 1985)
petitionfor reiew denied (Minn. 1985).
100. NationalHydro Sys., 529 N.W.2d at 694.
101. Justice Coyne wrote a dissenting opinion arguing that the claim should have
been dismissed for circuity. Id. at 694-700.
102. 534 N.W.2d 261 (Minn. 1995).
103. Id. at 263.
104. Id.
105. Id.
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materials determined by GSI to be defective or non-conforming.
The foregoing warranty is in lieu of all other warranties
express or implied, and of all obligations or liabilities on the
part of GSI for damages, including but not limited to
consequential and/or special damages arising out of or in
connection with the use or operation
o the equipment sold
10 6
or leased by this agreement.
Almost immediately after delivery, there were problems with
the photoplotter due to shifting that caused the images to
appear blurry. °7 The trial court found that Gerber had
expressly warranted that the photoplotter would be free from
material and workmanship defects, and that although the
implied warranty of fitness for a particular purpose had effectively been waived, the implied warranty of merchantability had not
been waived."0 ' The jury found that the express warranty had
not been breached, but that the implied warranty of merchantability had been breached, and that the remedy enumerated had
failed its essential purpose. 9 The Minnesota Court of Appeals
affirmed. 1 0
The primary question that came before the supreme court
was whether a limitations of damages section that failed its
essential purpose also caused a waiver of consequential damages
provision in the agreement to fail. Under Minnesota's version
of the U.C.C. an agreement may provide for remedies in
addition to or in substitution for those provided in the statute."1 1 Where one of these substituted remedies fails in its
essential purpose, the remedy is no longer exclusive or limited
by the agreement.1 12 Consequential damages may be limited
13
or excluded unless such an exclusion is unconscionable.
Jurisdictions have long battled over the interpretation of this
statute as a whole. Most early cases held that when a limited

106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
1994).

Id.
Id.
Id. at 265.
Id.
International Fin. Servs., Inc. v. Franz, 515 N.W.2d 379, 387-88 (Minn. Ct. App.

MINN. STAT. § 336.2-719(1)(a) (1994).
112. MINN. STAT. § 336.2-719(2) (1994).
113. MINN. STAT. § 336.2-719(3) (1994).
111.
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remedy failed its essential purpose, the clause excluding
consequential damages also became unenforceable." 4 The
rationale behind this theory is that once limitation language has
failed, the remedies provided by the statute should take over in
full force.115 Recently, however, some courts have held that in
transactions between parties of equal bargaining power, the
clause excluding consequential damages will survive even if the
other limitation of remedies clause fails its essential purpose.1 6
The rationale for this theory is that in cases where the consequential damages are limited in a clause independent and
distinct from of the other remedy limitation language, the
parties should be allowed to form their own bargain. 1 7 Where
the clauses are independent and distinct, the parties clearly
intend the ability of the clauses to survive to be independent.
The Minnesota Supreme Court adopted the latter view. It
held that in transactions between merchants, an exclusive
remedy section that does not fulfill its essential purpose does not
render a clause excluding consequential damages invalid if the
118
clauses are independent and discrete contractual provisions.
Here, Gerber refused to replace the unit that was defective, and
the unit originally delivered was irreparable. 9 As a result, the
exclusive remedy provision in the agreement failed its essential
purpose. 2 ° The exclusion of consequential damages, however,
21
is independent and discreet and therefore will survive.
The court was careful to limit the impact of this decision
because courts throughout the nation are in such disagreement
on this issue. The holding was expressly limited to agreements
between merchants of relatively equal bargaining power.122 In
dicta, the court stated that consumer contracts will continue to
be governed by the "old" rule in which consequential damage
exclusion clauses are deemed invalid if the exclusive remedy

114.

See Riley v. Ford Motor Co., 442 F.2d 670, 673 (5th Cir. 1971).

115.

SeeJAMESJ. WHITE AND ROBERT S. SUMMERS, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 379-

80 (1972).
116. See American Elec. Power Co. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 418 F. Supp. 435
(S.D.N.Y. 1976).
117. Id. at 458.
118. International Fin. Servs., Inc. v. Franz, 534 N.W.2d 261, 269 (Minn. 1995).
119. Id. at 266.
120. Id. at 267.
121. Id. at 269
122. Id.
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clause fails its essential purpose.
F

23

Landlord Liability for a Mechanic's Lien

In Master Asphalt Co. v. Voss Constr Co.,1" 4 the Minnesota
Supreme Court held that: 1) a landowner's actual knowledge of
tenant improvements is required to establish his liability for a
mechanic's lien; and 2) that more than a general awareness of
the intent of the tenant to make such improvements is required
to show that the landowner had actual knowledge of the
improvements.
Henry and Marion Reinke (the Reinkes), residents of
Illinois, own three parcels of commercial property in downtown
Minneapolis. 125 In 1991 they leased the land to the Farmer's
Market Annex (FMA). The lease stated that the tenant must
obtain authorization prior to making improvements on the
land. 2 6 At the time of the deal, the president of the FMA
expressed his desire to make some improvements on the
land. 12 7 Reinke acknowledged these intentions, but was not
told if or when the improvements would actually begin.1 2 ' The
FMA, without contacting the Reinkes, contracted with the Voss
Construction Company to construct metal canopy tops for the
Reinkes' property.
Voss subcontracted the electrical work and asphalt work,
which was completed in October 1991.1 ° Voss was paid by the
FMA, but subsequently declared bankruptcy and failed to pay the
subcontractor.13 ' The Reinkes, still in Illinois, had not inspected the property since the signing of the lease. Two mechanic's
32
lien actions ensued.
The Minnesota mechanic's lien statute provides that when
improvements are made by one party on the land of another,
the owner of the property may protect her rights by either
serving on the parties doing the work or by posting on the sight

123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.

Id.
535 N.W.2d 349 (Minn. 1995).
Id. at 350.
Id.
Id. at 351.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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a written statement that the improvement is not being done at
her insistence.'
This notice to the contractors protects the
landowner from having her land subject to a mechanic's lien
action when her tenant defaults on a payment, and puts the
contractors on notice that a mechanic's lien is not available as a
3 4
means to collect payment."
Minnesota courts have long held that pursuant to the
mechanic's lien statute, the property interests of a landowner
who has no knowledge of the improvements to her property
cannot be subjected to a lien for those improvements. 3 5 A
landowner who does have notice of the improvements, however,
is deemed to have consented to the work and therefore must
comply 3with
the notice requirements to protect herself from
6
liability.
Therefore, the first question for the court was whether the
Reinkes had authorized the improvements made by the FMA.
The Minnesota Court of Appeals found that the Reinkes had
authorized the improvements by not expressly objecting when
they first learned of the FMA's desire to make them.1 7 The
focus at the appellate level was on the conversations between the
Reinke's and the FMA while forming their agreement.'ls The
fact that they knew of the desire to make the improvements
coupled with a lease that allowed such improvements was
deemed by the court
of appeals to show the authorization of the
3 9
improvements.
The supreme court disagreed. It ruled that to authorize
something is more than just giving permission."4° It means an41
affirmative grant of authority to make such an improvement.'
Here, the Reinkes could not authorize the improvements unless
42
they had actual knowledge that the repairs were being made.
The contractors argued that the Reinkes had actual

133.
134.

MINN. STAT. § 514.06 (1994).
Id.

135. See Anderson v. Harrison, 281 Minn. 95, 97-8, 160 N.W.2d 560, 562 (1968).
136. Id.
137. Master Asphalt, 535 N.W.2d at 352.
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. Id. (citing Berglund & Peterson v. Wright, 148 Minn. 412, 417, 192 N.W. 624,

626 (1921)).
142.

MasterAsphalt, 535 N.W.2d at 353.

http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol22/iss1/17

16

Heiberg: A Survey of ImportantCONTRACTS
Decisions of the Minnesota Supreme Court: 1

19961

knowledge of the improvement because they were made aware
that the tenant was contemplating such improvements at the
time the lease was signed. 4 ' The court rejected this argument
and held that actual notice required more than just a general
awareness of the possibility.1"
To have actual knowledge
within the purview of the mechanic's lien statute, the landowner
must have actual knowledge that the improvements are underway.145 Here, the trial court made a finding of fact that the
Reinkes did not know the repairs were under way.1" As a
result, the Reinkes were not required to post a statement of their
rights47at the work scene to avoid the possibility of a mechanic's
1

lien.

Eric Heiberg

143. Id.
144.

Id.

145.

See MINN. STAT. § 514.06 (1994); Bruer Lumber Co. v. Kenyon, 166 Minn. 357,

359, 208 N.W. 10, 11 (1926).

146. Master Asphalt, 535 N.W.2d at 354.
147.
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